shone his rival in daring feats, but both finally found their death on the battlefield in attempts to reconnoiter behind the enemy's skirmish line.

That in the patriotic young officer from Ohio who fought and exposed himself consciously for a good cause, bravery had the moral attributes of a genuine virtue, there can hardly be a question. But what kind of virtue was the bravery—for he was unquestionably " brave"—of the young nobleman who really did not care what cause he was fighting for, but was inspired in his daring exploits mainly—perhaps solely—by his sportive delight in meeting danger? Yet, although his bravery was merely temperamental, if he had been in a higher and more conspicuous position, he would have been celebrated among our " heroes/*

I must confess that observations like these have made me rather distrustful of the moral merit of that kind of courage or bravery which is merely, or mainly, temperamental. No doubt it has its value, and great value, too, in the arbitrament of arms. But we should not be seduced by the glamour it is apt to produce upon the imagination, to attribute to it all sorts of moral qualities and intellectual faculties which it may or may not possess—or rather the possession of which is not only not proved, but not even indicated by the display of military valor.

What rational answer is there to the question whether the

moral merit of the bravery shown by the soldier in storming a hostile battery is greater than that shown by the fireman in saving a child from the flames at the risk of his own life, or by the member of the life-saving station on the seashore who plunges into the raging surf to rescue a shipwrecked sailor? Nay, is not—ceteris paribus—that fireman, or that member of the life-saving crew, even a greater hero, morally, consider-